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This paper focuses on the role of insider trading activity in Malaysia. It attempts to indicate the existence of the 
abnormal profit from this activity.  Recently developed countries like United States and United Kingdom have 
reported that the activity can no longer gives abnormal profit for long period due to laws imposed in those countries, 
attention now turns to emerging market like Malaysia. By using event study analysis, 200 cases of insider trading 
activity reported between January 2008 and March 2009 were closely examine and the result shows that while 
abnormal return do exist, it is mostly not significant. This paper also looks at the individuals and institutional insider 
and their performances respectively.  
 





The efficient-market hypothesis asserts that financial 
markets are "informationally efficient" in which prices 
on traded assets will reflect all known information, and 
instantly change to reflect new information. According 
to the weak form efficient market, it is impossible for 
investor to consistently outperform the market by using 
any information that the market already knows.  When 
the market is said to be efficient, it indicates no 
individual can have higher expected trading profits than 
others because of monopolistic access to information. 
However this conclusion does not hold in the existence 
of insider trading. 
 
Insider trading is an activity of trading corporation’s 
stock or any other securities by individuals with 
potential access to non-public information about the 
company. The study on insider trading can be 
categorized into two broad areas. The first category of 
this studies emphasis on insider trading regulations and 
their reaction to its enforcement. The second category 
on insider trading which also attracts reviewer is 
regarding the profit making from the activities.  
 
In order to gain abnormal return, insider will have to 
repeatedly beat the market. In doing so, they will have 
to pay some attention to the enforcement of laws in that 
certain country and several hallmarks that could be 
important in their efforts to beat the market. 
 
In recent years, it is found that insider in developed 
market such as U.S, Japan and U.K cannot consistently 
outperform the market which means the activity of 
collecting abnormal profit is close to none. Shen (2007) 
claims this happens because investor in those countries 
react simultaneously to any relevant news and the 
efficiency of their insider trading regulations. The story 
is not similar in emerging market like Hong Kong and 
China as described by Huang (2004), Shen (2007) and 
Cheuk et.al (2006). Their studies found that the 
possibility of constantly outperforming the market is 
higher if the individual investors trace the trading 
patterns of institutional investor. Chung (2010) claims 
the trading activities by established institutional 
investor is likely to be influenced by insider trading. 
Shen (2007) attributes the high activity of illegal insider 
trading in China and Hong Kong with the less 
enforcement of insider trading regulations in both 
countries.   Malaysia is also considered as emerging 
market. Thus, it is interesting to know whether insider 
can still gain abnormal return in Malaysia under the 
regulation and supervision of Capital Market and 
Service Act (CMSA) and Securities Commissions. 
 
The study on insider trading activity in Malaysia is 
relatively scarce and hardly to be found. This might left 
one to wonders about the situation in Malaysia and the 
possibility of attaining abnormal profit weeks in and 
weeks out. This study will examine if there is insider 
trading activity in Malaysia and their performance 
against the market. It will also answer the chances of 
acquiring abnormal profit in Malaysia. 
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Literature Review  
 
Efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is among the oldest 
theory in investment field. It was widely accepted up 
until the 1990s, when behavioral finance economists, 
who were a fringe element, became mainstream. The 
efficient-market hypothesis asserts that financial 
markets are "informationally efficient", or that prices on 
traded assets (e.g., stocks, bonds, or property) already 
reflect all known information, and instantly change to 
reflect new information. Therefore, according to the 
theory, it is impossible to consistently outperform the 
market by using any information that the market 
already knows.  
 
The theory describes three forms of market efficiency; 
weak, semi-strong and strong form market. A strong-
form market efficient assumes all available public and 
private information is fully reflected in a security's 
market price. The strong form, in terms of market 
participants, also assumes that no individual can have 
higher expected trading profits than others because of 
monopolistic access to information. Overwhelming 
evidence shows that market is not strong form efficient. 
This is due to insider trading activity done by 
individuals inside the organization itself who have 
enough information to decide whether to 
acquire/dispose their stocks in relative to the ‘private’ 
information they have and thus gaining abnormal 
return.  
 
The studies on insider trading activity have attracted a 
lot of attention from scholars all over the world. While 
some researcher still question the possibility of using 
insider trading activity as guidelines in attaining 
abnormal profit, others tend to study the effectiveness 
and the enforcement of insider trading activity. 
 
This study is interested in determining the existence of 
insider trading activity in Malaysia with the objective of 
investigating whether there is a chance for insider 
dealer to gain abnormal profit. The compilation and 
remarks on finding by previous researchers will next be 
documented in three sections. The first section will give 
some basic understanding on insider trading and person 
involved with it. Second section will give some insight 
on effect of regulation on insider trading. The 
discussion on Malaysian Securities Industry Act 1983 
(SIA) and the Securities Industry (Central Depositories) 
Act 1991 (SICDA) will also be covered in this section. 
The third section of this literature will present the 
findings by previous scholars regarding the abnormal 
return and several insiders trading behavior. It is the 
main motive for this study to correlate the studies and 
findings from other country and prove whether the 
situation is identical in Malaysia.  
Insider trading  
 
Jaffe (1982) define insider trading as trading done by 
corporate officers, directors and large stockholder who 
possess special information about the company. The 
information they have will assist them in making 
decision that shall help them in achieving abnormal 
profit. To sum it all, insider trading is an activity of 
trading corporation’s stock or any other securities by 
individuals with potential access to non-public 
information about the company. 
 
Many scholars argue about the correct definition of 
insider. A definition, however, emerges from activities 
that are prohibited under the insider-trading provisions 
and regulation. In recent years, most countries have 
amended their regulation in defining insider trading 
with special attention given to broaden the definition of 
insider.  
 
Insiders in this study are defined by Securities Industry 
Act 1983 (SIA) as persons who have in their possession 
information that is not generally available. Basically, it 
includes persons with fiduciary duties such as CEOs or 
directors, a member of a director's family, a body 
corporate which is associated with that director, or a 
substantial shareholder. In addition, a person who 
communicates inside information to enable another 
person to use it for his advantage, the second-
mentioned person, known as a "tippee", can also be 
considered as an insider. 
 
The definition of insider is almost similar in other 
countries. In the United States and Germany, for 
mandatory reporting purposes, corporate insiders are 
defined as a company's officers, directors and any 
beneficial owners of more than ten percent of a class of 
the company's equity securities. 
 
Several authors make some classifications in 
determining insider trading.  Arshadi (1998) 
differentiate insider into three types of which are 
registered insider, temporary insider and tippees and 
tippers. Registered insiders are the officers, directors 
and beneficial owners of 10% or more of a class of 
registered equity shares. This is also parallel with U.S’s 
Section 16 of the Exchange Act. Temporary insiders are 
individuals and firms that are not employed by the firm 
but are temporarily retained for a specific purpose, such 
as investment bankers, attorneys, and accountants. A 
tippee is not an insider of the firm but receives material 
non-public information from either a registered or a 
temporary insider (the tipper) who passes the 
information to enable that party to trade on it. This style 
of classifying an insider is also supported and being 
used by other authors like Ohara (2001) and McGee 
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(2007) among others. 
 
The classification also conforms to the list of identified 
insider trading groups as listed by Beams et.al (2003) 
with assist from Securities Exchange Commissions 
(SEC) website. The first group is corporate officers, 
directors, and employees who traded the corporation's 
securities after learning of significant, confidential 
corporate developments. The second group consists of 
friends, business associates, family members, and other 
"tippees" of such officers, directors, and employees, 
who traded the securities after receiving such 
information. The third group comprises of employees of 
law, banking, brokerage, and printing firms who are 
given such information to provide services to the 
corporation whose securities they traded. Government 
employees who learned of such information because of 
their employment by the government are categorized as 
fourth group while the last group is the other persons 
who misappropriated and took advantage of 
confidential information from their employers. 
 
The next step after examining the definition of insider 
trading and insider is to decide the form of transaction 
to be selected in the study. Kara and Denning (1998) 
and Seyhun (1990) excludes any insider trading 
transaction if it includes any exercise of options, shares 
acquired from a compensation plan and private 
transactions. They only considered open market 
purchases and sales as their variable.  Open-market 
sales and purchases occur more frequently for 
information reasons as proven by Seyhun. The same 
method as used by Kara and Denning (1998) and 
Seyhun (1990) will be employed in this study. 
Meanwhile, in terms of insider trading group selected 
as samples for study, this study will try to cover all five 
classes of group suggested by Beams et.al (2003) 
although it will depend a lot on the availability of the 
data. 
 
Regulation on insider trading activity  
 
Before we discuss about the regulation of insider 
trading, we must first understand the motives and 
rationale of insider trading activity. Beams et.al (2003) 
in their study suggests that guilt had the greatest effect 
on intent to trade based on insider information. 
Expected gain, cynicism, and perceptions of the 
fairness of laws were also significantly associated with 
the intent to trade based on insider information. 
Another finding on reasons for insider trading as found 
by Ma and Sun (1998) are as follows; first it is due to 
the portfolio diversification and liquidity adjustment. 
Firm managers often acquire stock through a plan or an 
exercise of options. They may later sell it to diversify 
their portfolios. Managers may also sell their stock due 
to financial need. This is why insiders have normally 
made more sales than purchases of their firm's stock. 
The second reason is the corporate control. Managers 
purchase their firm's stock to increase their share of 
total stockholding and enhance their voting power in 
the firm. Another reason could be based on private 
information. This falls into two subcategories. First, 
insiders may purchase the firm's stock because they 
genuinely believe the stock is a good investment. 
Second, insiders may trade prior to announcements that 
will generate abnormal returns for themselves. 
 
With such motives of insider, there is nothing can stop 
them but the boundary set by law and regulation. 
Regulation and laws of insider trading are made in 
order to prevent any manipulation of stock by insider. 
Rules for insider trading fall into two categories. The 
first one, namely called corporate insider rule is the 
rules that prohibit corporate insiders—officers, 
directors, and major beneficial shareholders—from 
certain kinds of trading activity in the securities of their 
own company. These forbid short sales by insiders and 
allow the company to recover any profits realized on 
purchase/sales cycles completed within a six-month 
period (short-swing profits). The second rules prohibit 
trading on material, inside (nonpublic) information. 
These forbid anyone, insider or not, from trading 
profitably on inside information. These can be termed 
the inside information rules.  
 
McGee (2007) reckons the first country to have a law 
regarding insider trading are the United States followed 
by France. This is followed by other developed market 
like U.K., Australia, Japan, and Korea with help by 
United States’ law as model. This is followed suits by 
emerging markets like Malaysia, China and Hong 
Kong.  McGee also shows the slow establishment of 
laws on insider trading. As of 1990, only thirty-four 
countries had laws restricting or prohibiting insider 
trading, and only nine of them had prosecuted anyone 
for insider trading. By 2000, the numbers increased. By 
that time, eighty-seven countries had passed insider 
trading laws and 38 had prosecuted at least one insider 
trading case. 
 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) provide additional 
information on passing ofinsider trading laws and years 
taken for person to be charged in violate the rules. The 
result seems to indicate that countries are not enforcing 
or perhaps do not strictly prosecuted the traders 
involve. Median for the developed countries is 1989 
while the first reported case is in 1993. For emerging 
countries the median years on law creation is 1992 and 
only 5 years later the first case was brought to justice. 
 
Question arises then on why it takes too long for the 
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regulators to establish the law pertaining to insider 
trading. Among the answers that could appear as 
excuses are the effectiveness of the law itself and the 
perception on insider trading activity. Although it is 
widely accepted that insider trading is unethical, there 
are also several groups strongly disagree with the rules 
and restriction on insider trading.  
 
There are at least three theories against the enforcement 
of a ban on insider trading. The first one, victimless 
crime was developed by Herzel and Katz (1987) which 
states that insider trading has no victim. This is because 
transactions carried out by the insider moves the stock 
price in the same direction as preferential information 
and consequently the counterpart of the insider also 
takes advantage of the insider’s transactions. The 
second theory is based on the concept that the only 
effective way to compensate managers is through the 
exploitation of preferential information. This is because 
of the fact that bonus and stock options are not flexible 
enough and financially viable for the company. This 
concept was brought forward by Manne in 1966. The 
latest theory against the regulation of the crime exploits 
the concept of market efficiency in its strong form, i.e. 
the stock price reflects all available information, 
preferential included. Hence, by carrying out his 
strategy, the insider pushes the stock price faster 
towards the value which better reflects the 
fundamentals of the company. A comprehensive study 
on pros and contras of insider trading is documented by 
Minenna (2003). 
 
There are also numerous studies done with aim to 
establish the effect of regulation on insider trading. 
Arguably, the most studied is the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act 1984 (ITSA). Eyssell and Reburn (1993) 
found evidence that ITSA can significantly reduce 
insider trading activity. In their study on seasoned 
equity, they found that there is significant reduction in 
abnormal selling prior to SEO announcement for the 
post-ITSA as compare to pre-ITSA era. Their finding is 
supported by Garfinkel (1997), Arshadi and Eyssell 
(1991) and Seyhun (1990). Masson and Madhavan 
(1991) also agree with the theory and claim current 
regulations tend to discourage insider trading activity. 
A study in New Zealand by Pinfold et.al (2007) shows 
that since the amendment made on Regulation of 1988, 
insider could not achieve abnormal profits anymore. 
The study on the same country by Gilbert and Tourani-
Rad (2008) also found identical result.  
 
Insider trading regulations are intended to keep insider 
from using non-public information to the disadvantage 
of others. Unfortunately, some studies found that the 
laws have been largely ineffective. Jaffe (1974) and Lin 
& Hoe (1990) are among scholars to prove this. Studies 
in China by Cheng (2008) also prove that laws are not 
sufficient with most insider trading activities there are 
done by high-ranking government and party officials. 
Another study was done in Spain by Brio et.al (2003) 
suggesting the changes of law in Spain could not 
prevent insider trading; ironically Spain is one of the 
few countries where insider trading is still considered 
legal. 
 
The different findings by previous scholars are 
explained by Eyssell and Reburn (1993) as a result of 
different test on various countries which have different 
laws. Another reason for the different findings is the 
degree of enforcement in different time and places. 
Khan and Lamba (2001) claim that insider trading still 
gains despite ITSA because insider do not suffer high 
penalty and will only have to pay penalty on the profit 
earned on their trades. They later suggest that 
regulation need to be enforced to the fullest extends.  
 
In Malaysia, insider trading is governed by Capital 
Market and Service Act (CMSA). Section 188 (2) of the 
CMSA prohibits an insider in possession of certain 
information, as described in Section 183, Section 184 
and Section 185 from acquiring, disposing or procuring, 
directly or indirectly, an acquisition or disposal of, or 
the entering into an agreement for or with a view to the 
acquisition or disposal of such securities. By virtue of 
Sections 190 and 191 of the CMSA, the prohibition of 
insider trading also extends to secrecy arrangements by 
corporations and partnerships.  
 
Abnormal returns  
 
Arguably the main objective for insider trading is to 
gain abnormal return. Abnormal return and its behavior 
have been documented in most of the study done 
previously.  What actually creates this return? Givoly 
and Palmon (1982) observed and found that major part 
of insider trading return is likely due to price changes 
arising from the information revealed through the trades 
themselves. 
 
The classic study by Finnerty (1976) was to be one of 
the first to discover the abnormal return. His study on 
insider trading and efficient market hypothesis 
concludes by summarizing that insiders are able to 
outperform the market. Insiders can and do identify 
profitable as well as unprofitable situations within their 
corporations. This finding tends to refute the strong-
form of the efficient market hypothesis. 
 
Lamba and Khan (1999) prove that traders earn positive 
abnormal return around the listing announcement date. 
They also claim insiders are net seller over the months 
leading up to delisting month. The most important 
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findings though are that investor can use insider as 
gauge to purchase/buy securities. 
   
Ramirez and Yung (2000) focus their study on insider 
trading and investment bank reputation. They found 
that cumulative abnormal returns are positive after 
insiders of investment banking industry have purchased 
stocks of their own firm. The authors also suggest not 
to compile together studies of banking/financial 
industry firms with non banking/financial firms as 
biased will likely affect the result. Thus in this study, 
we will not be considering companies from the 
financial sector. 
 
An important part of insider trading will be the timing. 
Lin and Howe (1990) found evidence demonstrating 
that insiders sell stock following periods of positive 
abnormal returns and buy after periods of negative 
abnormal returns. Further, the transactions of insiders 
have predictive content. Thus, insiders who have 
already decided to trade appear to be able to profit from 
using their information to time their transactions. 
   
Heinkel and Kraus (1987) and Chakravarty and 
McConnell (1999) went further to study if there is any 
significant different between insider and non insider 
(outsider). Surprisingly, insider do not outperform 
outsider significantly which lead to their conclusion 
that effect of insider trading and non insider trading is 






This study used 200 cases of insider trading activities 
out of 4,782 cases (excluding any activities in 
MESDAQ market) recorded during the period of 
January 2008 until March 2009; 100 of which were 
taken from the cases of insiders’ selling activities and 
another 100 from insiders’ buying activities. The 
company data were taken from the Bursa Malaysia 
website (www.bursamalaysia.com) while the price 
movements were collected from DataStream. 
This study used random sampling method. Companies 
from various sectors listed on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia were considered for this analysis. Out of all 
the sectors, the finance sector was excluded from 
further analysis in order to minimize biases.  The 
samples were then randomly selected after the names of 
the company have been alphabetically sorted. Another 
criterion used in selecting the sample is that only 
companies with more than 100,000 shares exchanges 
were considered for further analysis.  This analysis 
focused on open-market purchases and sales by officers 
and directors with exclusion of options exercises, 
private transactions, and all transactions by beneficial 
owners. 
 
The 200 cases selected as samples were further divided 
into four groups; sales by individual insider, sales by 
institutional insider, purchase by individual insider and 
purchase by institutional insider. Appendix A 
summarizes the sample used in this study. 
 
As explain by M.-Y. Cheuk et. al (2006), there are 
many possible motivations exist behind an insider 
transaction. The activity of insider’s disposal could be 
down to liquidity reasons and diversification of 
investment risk. Insiders also acquire shares as a result 
of exercising options. However, the general public and 
researchers tend to think that the more likely and 
intriguing reason behind insider transactions is private 
information. These groups of people are likely to react 
by purchasing or selling their ownership in response to 





 This study employed the traditional event-study 
analysis. This event-study analysis was applied in this 
study in order to estimate the effect on stock returns 
towards any event that could give an impact on the 
company. This type of studies is most often used to test 
the existence and also the degree of insider trading. 
 
The process of event study was instigated by 
determining the date upon which the market would 
have received the news. The date selected has to reflect 
when the public reasonably expected the news. This 
event date is vital for the next step, which is examining 
the return for the individual companies prior and posts 
the event date. Researchers noted and took interest in 
the price reaction before (t=-1, t=-2, etc), during event 
date (t=0) and after (t=+1, t=+2, etc) a specific event 
occurs.  
 
Researchers then measured the abnormal return which 
is gauged by the difference between observed returns 
and ‘no-news” returns for each firm. The abnormal 
returns observed were then aggregated across 
companies and across time. Subsequently, these 
aggregated returns were statistically tested to determine 
the result. 
There are several approaches of event study although 
only two were used in this study namely, market model 




Most of the literatures recommend using standard 
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market model to estimate abnormal returns associated 
to insider activities. These have been done previously 
by Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986 and 1998) and 
Damodaran & Liu (1993) among others. The single 
market model is 
                                                                        
 
tmit
rr                         (1) 
 
Where ri is the return on firm i, rm is the return on the 
market proxy, and ε is the Gaussian error term. α and β 
are parameters to be estimated. In this study, prior event 
date from day -75 to day -6 are used to estimates both α 
and β. 
The returns are measured as 











r                            (2) 
 
Where Pt is the price at time t, Pt-1 is the price the day 
before, and Dt is the dividend payment, if any, on date t. 
The market return (rm) will also be compute in a similar 
manner 
The abnormal return to firm j on day t, ARit, is then 
calculated from day-5 to day +20 for each day as 
follows: 
                                                                        
RRAR
itit
                              (3)  
 
With ARit is an abnormal return of security i during 
period t, Rit is rate of return on security i during period t 
and R is the average return on a market index during 
period t.  
 
The average abnormal return (AAR) across firms for 
each day is: 







ARtAAR                          (4) 
       
 
where N is the number of firms with insider trading on 
day t.  
 
The significance of the average abnormal return is 
tested by the statistic 









           (5) 
 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) to the 
insider trading firms from day- D to day D is the sum of 
the average abnormal returns between day-D and day 
D. The formula is: 







AARCAAR                                        (6) 
  
In order to assess the performance of stocks traded by 
insiders and the degree of market efficiency in the stock 
market, we examined the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAAR) associated with insider purchases and 
sales for various post-event periods. The CAARs of the 
transactions were then analyzed as a whole and any 
persistent abnormal returns found after the day on 
which the public is informed of any insider trading 
indicates that the market reacts to the dissemination of 
such information. Theoretically, if such abnormal 
returns exist, then it is likely that outsiders can actually 
earn abnormal profits by mimicking the trades of 
insiders. 
 
Market adjusted return model 
 
Another approach is the market-adjusted return. This 
method is easier than market model and actually has 
same similarities in calculating the variables. First is the 
step in defining an abnormal return for individual stock. 
Researchers typically assumed that the individual stock 
should experience returns equal to the aggregate stock 
market.  This assumption meant that the market-
adjustment process simply entailed subtracting the 
market return from the return for the individual 




                                  (7) 
 
Where ARit is an abnormal return of stock i on event 
day t, Rit  is rate of return on stock i on event day t and 
R is the average return on a market index on event day t  
 
Next, the average abnormal return (AARt) return for 
each time period t is calculated.  











                       (8)  
Nt = The number of valid observations on event day t. 
  
Next, cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR) on a 








AARCAAR                           (9) 
Where T = some number of event days prior to day t. 
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Test for individuals and institutions 
  
This study examined the behavior of the individual and 
institutional on the event period. Two tests were used in 
this study, namely the parametric and non-parametric 
tests. The event window selected will be the same from 
the above event window (t=0 to t=3, t=0 to t=5,. t=0 to 
t=10,. t=0 to t=15,. t=0 to t=20). In this analysis, 
abnormal returns accrued to institutional are compared 
to those of individuals. 
 
Analysis and Findings 
 
As shown by Figure 1, selling activities lead to constant 
drop in returns. The graph proves that by selling their 
stocks, insiders are able to predict future price 
performances and manage to avoid losses.  
 
Figure 1: The cumulative average abnormal return for 
selling activity using market model 
 
 
In the case of purchasing, the trends are bullish as 
CAAR increase over time after the event date. CAAR is 
always above than zero (0). This is represented by 
Figure 2 below. 
 
Figure 2: The cumulative average abnormal return for 
purchasing activity using market model. 
 
In addition, Table 1 shows the daily average abnormal 
return for the whole event windows ranging from t=-5 
to t= 20. The table proves that AAR is always positive 
for insider purchase which indicates that insider has 
private information of the company. It also provides 
evidence that on every day, the abnormal return from 
purchasing is greater than abnormal return from selling.   
 





AAR T-STAT AAR T-STAT 
-5 1.38% 0.981 -0.29% -0.641 
-4 0.68% 0.485 0.18% 0.389 
-3 2.06% 1.349 -0.15% -0.284 
-2 1.30% 0.878 -0.71% -1.560 
-1 1.35% 0.901 -0.44% -1.112 
0 1.92% 1.294 0.65% 0.849 
1 1.10% 0.774 -0.90% -1.875 
2 1.30% 0.950 -0.38% -1.074 
3 0.70% 0.478 -0.27% -0.712 
4 1.39% 0.942 0.24% 0.398 
5 1.29% 0.873 -0.07% -0.130 
6 0.98% 0.602 -0.60% -0.913 
7 2.52% 1.264 0.77% 0.563 
8 0.92% 0.641 -0.52% -2.021 
9 0.90% 0.730 0.08% 0.200 
10 0.43% 0.346 -0.43% -0.891 
11 1.66% 1.176 0.10% 0.324 
12 0.80% 0.649 0.15% 0.271 
13 1.24% 0.996 0.06% 0.123 
14 0.86% 0.751 -0.53% -0.990 
15 1.02% 0.832 -0.53% -0.978 
16 1.42% 1.105 0.41% 0.857 
17 1.41% 1.110 0.05% 0.144 
18 0.65% 0.512 -0.68% -1.085 
19 1.71% 1.345 -0.70% -1.296 
20 
0.53% 0.421 -0.00543 -1.198 
 
Table 2 shows the cumulative average abnormal returns 
surrounding insider purchases (acquire) and sales 
(dispose). For insider purchases, it is proven that stocks 
purchased by insider will perform well and give profit 
to insider. However none of the event window is 
significant at 5% level. The findings are similar to 
previous research by Cheuk et.al (2006) who find that 
in Hong Kong, insiders are able to make abnormal 
profits from insider purchases. Furthermore, as the 
CAARs are positive within the 20-days period after the 
transaction, it will also encourage outsiders to purchase 
the stocks. Such a long period could also enable them to 
get the profit. 
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The situation is totally different in discussing insider 
sales. Table 2 indicates that insider sales will have a 
negative CAAR. This could be related to an expected 
poor operating performance in the future. The CAAR 
for the insider sales is negative for each period after 
event date with four out of five is not significant at 5% 
significant level or 1.96. Only period from t=0 to t=20 
is significant with CAAR of 3.67%. The performance 
also indicates that the insiders are doing the right things 
by selling their own stocks although they have to give 
up a bit part of their ownership. While investors who 
bought their shares will suffer losses, insider sales and 
those mimicking their activity are able to make profit, 
or at least avoid losses. 
 
Similar to previous findings by Finnerty (1976) and 
Seyhun (1998), the result suggests that corporate 
insiders are making more profit from their purchasing 
activity rather than their selling activity. The result 
shows that in the aggregate, although insiders are able 
to earn abnormal profits from both buying and selling, 
the magnitude of short-run abnormal profits associated 
with insider purchase is considerably larger than that 
associated with insider selling. 
 










CAAR                      
t-stat 
T=0 to T=3 5.02% 0.890 -0.92% -1.324 
T=0 to T=5 7.70% 0.903 -0.72% -0.730 
T=0 to T=10 13.44% 0.903 -1.43% -1.1123 
T=0 to T=15 19.03% 0.878 -2.21% -1.462 
T=0 to T=20 24.75% 0.893 -3.67% -2.013 
 
Result from market adjusted return analysis 
 
The graph of CAAR for insider selling activity using 
market adjusted return is significantly different from 
the graph derived by market model. Figure 3 shows that 














Figure 3: The cumulative average abnormal return for 
selling activity using market adjusted return 
 
 
For the insider purchase using market adjusted return, 
the graphs are almost similar to the one derived using 
market model. The different however occurs between 
day t=-5 until t=4 as CAAR recorded a negative return. 
After that, CAAR is always higher than zero. This is 
shown by Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: The cumulative average abnormal purchasing 
activity using market adjusted return. 
 
 
In Table 3, the average abnormal return is provided. It 
seems that the AAR for both purchase and sales are not 
constantly positive or negative. The situation in day t=6 
is interesting to be discussed. As the AAR for insider 
purchase is at its peak of 1.78%, the selling activity for 
insider gives a positive return of 1.79%. Thus, while 
any purchases on that day will bring wealth to the 
insiders, activity of sales will be a loss for them 
although both are insignificant at 5% significant level. 
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Table 3: Average daily abnormal returns for insider 




AAR T-STAT AAR T-STAT 
-5 0.09% 0.208 -0.22% -0.487 
-4 -0.40% -1.071 -0.31% -0.876 
-3 -0.21% -0.357 0.90% 2.508 
-2 -1.00% -1.838 -0.10% -0.272 
-1 0.35% 0.788 -0.21% -0.499 
0 0.55% 0.735 0.23% 0.589 
1 -0.33% -0.633 -0.32% -1.024 
2 0.01% 0.018 -0.41% -1.372 
3 -0.38% -0.758 -0.38% -1.294 
4 0.42% 0.703 0.17% 0.509 
5 0.01% 0.007 -0.63% -1.027 
6 1.78% 1.252 1.79% 1.310 
7 -0.74% -1.866 -0.50% -1.700 
8 1.34% 1.442 0.06% 0.151 
9 -0.45% -0.798 -0.16% -0.416 
10 -0.47% -0.846 -0.31% -0.821 
11 0.73% 1.616 0.24% 0.530 
12 0.98% 1.095 0.03% 0.088 
13 -0.37% -0.543 -0.49% -1.411 
14 0.72% 0.495 0.29% 0.989 
15 0.12% 0.242 -0.07% -0.216 
16 0.19% 0.360 0.64% 1.632 
17 -1.67% -1.397 -0.29% -0.623 
18 0.20% 0.424 -0.45% -0.953 
19 0.32% 0.496 0.49% 1.142 
20 0.28% 0.476 0.01% 0.013 
 
As shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4, by using market 
adjusted return, the AAR for selling activity are more 
volatile than AAR for purchasing activity during the 
period of the study. Table 4.4 shows that except for t=0 
to t=3, all other insider purchase is positive. However 
only for window period of t=0 to t=15 that CAAR is 
significant at 5% level of significant. It again proves 
that besides insiders, outsiders also can take profit from 
the market by following the step of insiders. 
 
For insider sales, while all the CAAR are negative 
which could indicate that insider are doing the right 
things to let go off their ownership, the t-stat proves 
that it is not significant. In fact, none of the event has a 








Table 4: Cumulative daily abnormal returns for insider 









CAAR                      
t-stat 
T=0 to T=3 -0.15% -0.187 -0.97% -1.653 
T=0 to T=5 0.28% 0.257 -1.40% -1.447 
T=0 to T=10 1.75% 1.375 -0.51% -0.483 
T=0 to T=15 3.94% 2.087 -0.47% -0.400 
T=0 to T=20 3.26% 1.312 0.01% 0.009 
 
Tests for individual and institutional insider 
 
Parametric and non-parametric test for selling activity 
 
Table 5 shows the means and t-statistic of institutional 
and individuals insider selling activity. Most of the 
activity are not significant except for institutional sales 
for event window of t=0 to t=5 with a mean 0f -1.61%. 
The institutional sales always have negative mean while 
individuals selling activity turns positive in the last 
three event windows tested. It means that for outsiders 
interested to avoid losses, they can learn from 
institutional activity. 
 
Table 5: Mean test and t-test for individuals and 
institutional selling activity. 
Event 
window Types N Mean t-test 
t=0 to t=3 Institutional 65 -1.07% -1.573 
 Individuals 34 -0.16% -0.179 
t=0 to t=5 Institutional 65 -1.61% -2.174 
 Individuals 34 -0.64% -0.615 
t=0 to t=10 Institutional 65 -1.17% -1.176 
 Individuals 34 1.17% 0.490 
t=0 to t=15 Institutional 65 -1.80% -1.656 
 Individuals 34 0.25% 0.107 
t=0 to t=20 Institutional 65 -2.55% -1.624 
 Individuals 34 2.26% 0.894 
 
By using parametric and non-parametric test for selling 
activity, the next table is derived. Table 6 shows that 
selling by institutional insiders lead to greater price 
decline. However none of the differences either by 
parametric, as measured by t-test of difference in 
means, and non-parametric tests, as measured by Mann-
Whitney, is different from zero. 
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Table 6: Results for parametric and non-parametric test for sales activity 




t=0 to t=3 
Institutional 65 -1.07% 
p=0.422 p=0.353 
Individuals 34 -0.16% 
t=0 to t=5 
Institutional 65 -1.61% 
p=0.453 p=0.275 
Individuals 34 -0.64% 
t=0 to t=10 
Institutional 65 -1.17% 
p=0.370 p=0.489 
Individuals 34 1.17% 
t=0 to t=25 
Institutional 65 -1.80% 
p=0.425 p=0.279 
Individuals 34 0.25% 
t=0 to t=20 
Institutional 65 -2.55% 
p=0.111 p=0.092 
Individuals 34 2.26% 
 
Parametric and non-parametric test for purchasing 
activity 
 
Table 7 shows that individual insiders have a positive 
mean in the last three event windows (t=0 to t=10, t=0 
to t=15 and t=0 to t=20). Event t=0 to t=10 and t=0 to 
t=15 are significant at 10% significant while t=0 to t=20 
is significant at 5% significant level. The purchases by 
the institutional insiders lead to negative returns but 
they are not significant. It indicates that unlike selling 
activity, outsiders interested with insider behavior 
should focus on individual rather than institutional 
insiders as they have private information to gain 
abnormal profit 
 
Table 7: Mean and t-test for individuals and 
institutional purchasing activity 
Event day Types N Mean t-test 
t=0 to t=3 
Institutional 65 -0.12% -0.147 
Individuals 35 -0.99% -0.597 
t=0 to t=5 
Institutional 65 -0.39% -0.440 
Individuals 35 -1.54% -0.788 
t=0 to t=10 
Institutional 65 -0.51% -0.456 
Individuals 35 6.72% 1.717 
t=0 to t=15 
Institutional 65 -0.36% -0.302 
Individuals 35 7.67% 1.785 
t=0 to t=20 
Institutional 65 -2.67% -1.330 
Individuals 35 10.71% 2.320 
Table 8 provides the result for t-test of difference in 
means and Mann Whitney test. The result suggests that 
purchases by individual insiders lead to price increases 
and the difference is significant for event window 0 to 
20.  
 
Table 8: Results for parametric and non-parametric test for purchasing activity 




t=0 to t=3 
 
Institutional 65 -0.12% 
p=0.642 p=0.504 
Individuals 35 -0.99% 
t=0 to t=5 
 
Institutional 65 -0.39% 
p=0.596 p=0.683 
Individuals 35 -1.54% 
t=0 to t=10 
 
Institutional 65 -0.51% 
p=0.083 p=0.207 
Individuals 35 6.72% 
t=0 to t=15 
 
Institutional 65 -0.36% 
p=0.080 p=0.235 
Individuals 35 7.67% 
t=0 to t=20 
 
Institutional 65 -2.67% 
p=0.011 p=0.04 




The possibility of consistently outperforming the 
market and collect abnormal profit is every investor 
dream but it is not practical according to efficient 
market theory. The activity of insider dealing is often 
accused as among the reason behind the violation of the 
theory. This study examined the announcement effects 
of insider trading by using the event study methodology 
in order to find any significant impact towards 
Malaysian stock market. It also tries to justify if the 
decision to mimicking the action of the insider is 




From the result and findings, it can be concluded that 
while there is an insider trading activity in Malaysia 
that could give abnormal profit to investor, most of it is 
insignificant. It proves that the market is efficient 
enough to avoid any consistent abnormal profit activity. 
The study also implies that purchasing activity could 
give more reward than selling activities, a conclusion 
that is agreed by scholars like Finnerty (1976) and 
Cheuk et.al (2006) among others. This justifies the 
decision of mimicking the insider’s action although the 
result suggest only for purchasing activity. Furthermore 
there is evidence that individual insiders give more 
impact than institutional insider for purchases 
 
The section headings are in boldface capital and 
lowercase letters. Use Times New Roman with fond 11. 
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